Kosovo and U.S. Policy by Woehrel, Steven & Kim, Julie
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RL31053
Kosovo and U.S. Policy
Updated January 3, 2003
Steven J.  Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Kosovo and U.S. Policy
Summary
In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end
to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav/Serb forces
in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region.  They were outraged by Serb atrocities against ethnic
Albanian civilians, and feared that the conflict could drag in other countries and
destabilize the region.  These efforts culminated in a 78-day NATO bombing
campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999.  Yugoslav leader Slobodan
Milosevic withdrew his forces from the province in June 1999.   Since that time,
Kosovo has been governed by a U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), under the terms
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244. At an undetermined time after an
autonomous government is in place, Kosovo’s final status is to be considered.
Almost all ethnic Albanians want independence for Kosovo; Serbs say it should
remain within Serbia.  The NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR is charged with
providing a secure environment for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244.
In May 2001, UNMIK issued a “Constitutional Framework” for Kosovo.  The
Constitutional Framework provides for an elected legislature and an autonomous
government with limited powers, but does not deal with Kosovo’s final status.
Elections for the Kosovo assembly were held on November 17, 2001.   About half
of eligible Serb voters  participated in the vote, after being urged to do so by the
Yugoslav and Serbian governments.  Political wrangling delayed the formation of a
government for months, but one was finally approved by the parliament in March
2002.  It consists of members of the three leading ethnic Albanian parties, as well as
a Serb minister and one from a non-Serb minority. 
Bush Administration officials have said that they support autonomy for Kosovo
within Serbia or the Serbia-Montenegro union,  but not independence.  President
Bush has said that, while the United States is looking to reduce its forces in the
Balkans, the United States would only do so in conjunction with its NATO allies.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Administration
officials said that U.S. forces in the Balkans could be withdrawn if they were needed
for the war on terrorism.  The United States has not unilaterally withdrawn its troops,
but in June 2002 NATO agreed to cut the number of troops in KFOR by nearly 25%.
This would translate into a withdrawal of roughly 1,300 U.S. troops of its force of
about 5,500. 
In 1999, Congress explicitly approved nor blocked U.S. participation in NATO
air strikes against Serbia, but appropriated funds for the air campaign and the U.S.
peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo. In 2000, several Members unsuccessfully
attempted to condition the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo on congressional
approval and on the implementation of aid pledges made by European countries.
Since 1999, Congress has provided funding for reconstruction in Kosovo, but limited
U.S. aid to 15% of the total amount pledged by all countries.  This report will be
updated as events warrant.
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Kosovo and U.S. Policy
Most Recent Developments
Kosovo held local elections on October 26, 2002, for the second time since the
end of the war.  Turnout for the vote was 54%, lower than in the previous two
elections. Observers attribute the low turnout to disillusionment with the
performance of the government and political parties in Kosovo.  The Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK in Albanian) confirmed its status as the leading party in
Kosovo, but lost ground compared to previous elections.  The LDK won 45% of the
vote, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), a party formed from the former Kosovo
Liberation Army, won 29%.   Another significant, although smaller, ex-KLA group,
the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), won 8.5%  Serb turnout was
particularly low, at about 20%.  Almost no Serbs voted in the troubled northern town
of Mitrovica, where local authorities intimidated potential voters.   These results may
indicate continuing Serb dissatisfaction with their situation in Kosovo.  UNMIK
officials said they were generally satisfied with the vote, but expressed
disappointment with low Serb turnout, adding that it could complicate efforts to
decentralize power in the province.
In November  2002, after the failure of municipal elections in Serb-controlled
north Mitrovica, UNMIK (with the agreement of the Serbian government) took over
control of the area, dissolving parallel Serb institutions there and removing
roadblocks that had divided it from ethnic Albanian-controlled areas of the city. 
The Serbian government has pledged to stop funding the parallel institutions.
Introduction
In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end
to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav forces in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region.  They were outraged by Serb
atrocities against ethnic Albanian civilians, and feared that the conflict could drag in
other countries and destabilize the region.  These efforts culminated in a 78-day
NATO bombing campaign against Serbia from March to June 1999.  Yugoslav leader
Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the province in June 1999,
clearing the way for the deployment of U.S. and other NATO peacekeepers.  While
NATO’s action ended Milosevic’s depredations in Kosovo, it has left U.S. and other
Western policymakers with many difficult issues to deal with.  These include creating
the conditions for the resumption of a normal life in Kosovo, including setting up an
autonomous government and reconstruction of the province, as well as dealing with
the thorny issue of Kosovo’s final status. Additional challenges emerged after the
deployment, including the rise of ethnic Albanian guerrilla movements in southern
Serbia and Macedonia, which threatened to destabilize the region before they were
dismantled in 2001.
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Kosovo At a Glance
Area: 10,849 sq. km., or slightly smaller than
Connecticut
Population: 1.956 million (1991 Yugoslav census)
Ethnic Composition: 82.2% Albanian; 9.9% 
Serbian.  Smaller groups include Muslims, Roma,
Montenegrins, Turks and others. (1991 Yugoslav
census)  
U.S. engagement in Kosovo has been controversial.   Proponents of engagement
say that instability in Kosovo could have a negative impact on the stability of the
Balkans and therefore of Europe as a whole, which they view as a vital interest of the
United States.  They believe instability in the region could produce an environment
favorable to organized crime and terrorism. In addition, they claim that such
instability could deal a damaging blow to the credibility and future viability of NATO
and Euro-Atlantic cooperation. They say the involvement of the United States is
critical to ensuring this stability, because of its resources and political credibility.  
Critics, including some in Congress, say that the situation in Kosovo does not
have as large an impact on vital U.S. interests as other issues, particularly the war on
terrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and
a possible war with Iraq.  They say that the Kosovo mission harms the readiness of
U.S. forces to deal with these more important contingencies.   They see the mission
in Kosovo as an ill-advised, open-ended exercise with unclear objectives.  They call
on European countries to take on the whole burden of the peacekeeping mission.
Both congressional advocates and opponents of U.S. engagement insist that the
Europeans pay the lion’s share of reconstruction aid to Kosovo. Reflecting increased
international focus on the global anti-terrorism campaign, there appears to be
growing interest in establishing a roadmap for “finishing the job,” including an
eventual “exit strategy” for the international civil and military administration of
Kosovo. 
War in Kosovo: February 1998-June 1999
Although the war in
Kosovo had deep historical
roots, its immediate causes can
be found in the decision of
Milosevic regime in Serbia to
eliminate the autonomy of its
Kosovo province in 1989. The
regime committed widespread
human rights abuses in the
following decade, at first
meeting only non-violent
resistance from the province’s
ethnic Albanian majority.  However, in 1998 ethnic Albanians calling themselves the
Kosovo Liberation Army began attacks on Serbian police and Yugoslav army troops.
The Milosevic regime responded with increasingly violent and indiscriminate
repression. From February 1998 until March 1999, conflict between the ethnic
Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb forces (as well as Serb attacks
on ethnic Albanian civilians) drove over 400,000 people from their homes and killed
more than 2,500 people. 
The United States and other Western countries used sanctions and other forms
of pressure to try to persuade Milosevic to cease repression and restore autonomy to
Kosovo, without success. The increasing deterioration of the situation on the ground
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led the international Contact Group (United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy
and Russia) to agree on January 29, 1999 on a draft peace plan for Kosovo.  They
invited the two sides to Rambouillet, near  Paris, to start peace talks based on the
plan on February 6.  As an inducement to the parties to comply, on January 30 the
North Atlantic Council agreed to authorize NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana
to launch NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia, after consulting with NATO
members, if the Serb side rejected the peace plan.  NATO said it was also studying
efforts to curb the flow of arms to the  rebels.  The draft peace plan called for 3-year
interim settlement that would provide greater autonomy for Kosovo within
Yugoslavia, and the deployment of a  NATO-led international military force to help
implement the agreement.   On March 18, 1999, the ethnic Albanian delegation to the
peace talks signed the plan, but the Yugoslav delegation rejected it.
NATO began air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24,
1999.  Yugoslav forces moved rapidly to expel most of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians
from their homes, many of which were looted and burned.   A December 1999 State
Department report estimated the total number of refugees and displaced persons at
over 1.5 million, over 90% of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population. The report says
that Yugoslav forces killed about 10,000 ethnic Albanians, and abused, tortured and
raped others. After 78 days of increasingly intense air strikes that inflicted damage
on Yugoslavia’s infrastructure and its armed forces,  President Milosevic agreed on
June 3 to a peace plan based on NATO demands and a proposal from the Group of
Eight countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia
and Japan).  It called for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; the
deployment of an international peacekeeping force with NATO at its core; and
international administration of Kosovo until elected interim institutions are set up,
under which Kosovo will enjoy wide-ranging autonomy within Yugoslavia.
Negotiations would be eventually be opened on Kosovo’s final status.
On June 9, 1999, NATO and Yugoslav military officers concluded a Military
Technical Agreement governing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.
On June 10, the U.N. Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1244, based on
the international peace plan agreed to by Milosevic.  KFOR began to enter Kosovo
on June 11.  The Yugoslav pullout was completed on schedule on June 20.  On June
20, the KLA and NATO signed a document on the demilitarization of the KLA.  (For
historical background to the conflict in Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20213, Kosovo:
Historical Background to the Current Conflict.  For chronologies of the conflict in
Kosovo, see Kosovo Conflict Chronology: January-August 1998, CRS Report 98-
752 F; Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September, 1998—March, 1999, CRS Report
RL30127; and the daily Kosovo Situation Reports collections for April (CRS Report
RL30137), May (CRS Report RL30156), and June 1999 (CRS Report RL30191).
Within weeks of the pullout of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the
deployment of  NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR, the overwhelming majority
of ethnic Albanian refugees returned to their homes.  At the same time, over 200,000
ethnic Serbs and other  minorities living in Kosovo left the province, according to the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. International officials estimate the number
of Serbs living in Kosovo at about 100,000.  Many of the Serbs remaining in the
province live in northern Kosovo, many  in or near the divided town of Mitrovica.
The rest are scattered in isolated enclaves in other parts of the province, protected by
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KFOR troops.  A key reason for the departures is violence and intimidation by ethnic
Albanians.  Kosovo Serbs say that since the pullout of Yugoslav forces, over 1,100
were killed  and over 1,000 are missing. Hundreds of houses of Serb refugees have
been looted and burned. 
Current Situation in Kosovo
Since June 1999, Kosovo has been ruled by the U.N. Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), currently headed by Michael Steiner of Germany.  According to U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK is tasked with gradually transferring its
administrative responsibilities to elected, interim autonomous government
institutions, while retaining an oversight role. In a final stage, UNMIK will oversee
the transfer of authority from the interim autonomous institutions to permanent ones,
after Kosovo’s final status is determined.     
Kosovo took the first steps in establishing its own elected institutions on
October 28, 2000, when OSCE-supervised municipal elections were held.  Most of
the parties running in the election differed little from each other on ideological
grounds, and are based more on personal loyalties and clan and regional affiliations.
The biggest of several parties to be formed from the ex-KLA is the Democratic Party
of Kosovo (PDK), headed by Thaci. Another significant, although smaller, ex-KLA
group is the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led by Ramush Haradinaj. A
third key political force in the province is Democratic League of Kosova (LDK),
headed by Ibrahim Rugova.  
The LDK was by far the ethnic Albanian largest party before the war, but it
began to lose ground after what some ethnic Albanians viewed as a passive stance
during the war.  However, the behavior of some ex-KLA leaders since the war,
including organized crime activity and violence against ethnic Albanian political
opponents, resulted in an improvement in the “more civilized” LDK’s standing.  The
LDK won 58% of the vote province-wide, the PDK 27.3%, the AAK, 7.7%.   Kosovo
Serbs boycotted the vote, charging that UNMIK and KFOR have been ineffective in
protecting them from ethnic Albanian violence.  They claimed that UNMIK and
KFOR are working toward the establishment of an independent Kosovo, which they
oppose. 
After consultation with local leaders, UNMIK issued a Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo in May 2001.  The
Constitutional Framework calls for the establishment of a 120-seat legislature, which
will elect a President and a  Prime Minister.  Twenty seats were reserved for ethnic
minorities, including 10 for Serbs, but Serbs do not have a veto power on laws passed
by the ethnic Albanian majority in the body.  UNMIK retains oversight or control of
policy in many areas, including law enforcement, the judiciary,  protecting the rights
of communities, monetary and budget policy, customs, state property and enterprises,
and external relations.  UNMIK can invalidate legislation passed by the parliament
if it is in conflict with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244.  KFOR remains in
charge of Kosovo’s security.  The Constitutional Framework does not address the
question of Kosovo’s final status. 
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1  The text  of  the consti tutional framework can be found at
[http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/constitframe.htm]
Leaders of ethnic Albanian parties voiced disappointment that the document did
not allow for a referendum to decide Kosovo’s final status.  They also said that the
Constitutional Framework gives Kosovars the illusion of self-rule rather than the
reality, since it reserves many key powers for UNMIK.  Kosovo Serb leaders
condemned the Constitutional Framework, saying it paved the way for Kosovo’s
independence and did not contain a mechanism to prevent the ethnic Albanian-
dominated legislature from abusing the rights of Serbs.1
On November 17, 2001, voters in Kosovo and displaced persons residing
outside of the province went to the polls to select the Assembly. The moderate
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK in Albanian) won 47 seats.  The nationalist
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the largest party formed from the former
Kosovo Liberation Army, won 26 seats.  Return, a coalition of Serbian parties, won
22 seats.  The Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), an ex-KLA party that has
tried to position itself as a pragmatic force, won 8 seats.  Four small ethnic Albanian
parties won one seat each. The remaining 13 seats were won by parties representing
the Bosniak, Turkish and Roma communities.   
In contrast to their boycott of the 2000 local elections, Kosovo Serbs turned out
in substantial numbers to vote in the November 2001 legislative elections.   Turnout
in Serb-majority areas was about 47%, according to the OSCE, while turnout in
Serbia and Montenegro was about 57%.  (This compares with a turnout of about 67%
in Albanian-majority areas). Serb turnout may have been depressed by conflicting
messages from Serb leaders. In the months leading up to the vote, Yugoslav and
Serbian leaders in Belgrade condemned UNMIK and KFOR’s ineffectiveness in
protecting Serbs in Kosovo and criticized the Constitutional Framework and the
planned elections.  However, after reaching a November 5, 2001 agreement with
UNMIK, they called for Kosovo Serbs to vote.  Nevertheless, some Kosovo Serbs
continued to call for a boycott, saying that Serb participation would legitimize
Kosovo institutions that would eventually lead to independence from Yugoslavia.
OSCE observers noted some efforts by boycott supporters to intimidate potential
voters, especially in Serb-controlled northern Kosovo.  
After months of political wrangling,  the Assembly chose a President and a
government in March  2002.   LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova was elected as President.
Kosovo’s Prime Minister is Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK.  The government consists
of members of the LDK, PDK and AAK.  One cabinet post is reserved for a Kosovo
Serb representative and another for a member of a non-Serb minority group.  The
Kosovo Serbs initially refused to join the government, saying they wanted greater
representation, but finally agreed to do so in May 2002, after Steiner agreed to
appoint a Kosovo Serb as an advisor on refugee returns.  
Kosovo held its second local elections on October 26, 2002.  Turnout for the
vote was 54%, lower than in the previous two elections.  Observers attribute the low
turnout to disillusionment with the performance of the government and political
parties in Kosovo.  The LDK confirmed its status as the leading party in Kosovo, but
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lost ground compared to previous elections.  The LDK won 45% of the vote, the
PDK 29%, and the AAK 8.55%.  Serb turnout was particularly low, at about 20%.
Almost no Serbs voted in the troubled northern town of Mitrovica, where local
authorities intimidated potential voters.  Among those Serbs who did vote in the
elections, the moderate Povratak (Return) coalition did poorly, while hard-line parties
did well.  These results may indicate continuing Serb dissatisfaction with their
situation in Kosovo, and with the failure of Serb moderates to improve it.  
Kosovo’s area of greatest violence since NATO’s deployment has been the
northern town of Kosovska Mitrovica, which is divided between the Serb-controlled
north and the Albanian-controlled south on either side of the Ibar river.  The Serbs
demand the town’s partition and recognition of a Serb-controlled municipality, while
the Albanians call for UNMIK to unite the town and end the Serbs’ armed blockade
of the bridge separating the two sections.  UNMIK and KFOR have largely tolerated
the town’s division, in the interest of preventing conflict, and have not tried to
establish U.N. authority over northern Mitrovica by force.  Tensions on the Serb side
have recently flared up in response to UNMIK arrests of some of the self-designated
Serb “bridge watchers,” with numerous demonstrations and protest rallies taking
place.  Mitrovica remains the  area of Kosovo most likely to explode into renewed
violent conflict.  The challenge for UNMIK and the interim Kosovo government is
to eliminate Mitrovica’s parallel administrative and security structures, while
providing for the security needs of the town’s Serb inhabitants.   
In November  2002, after the failure of municipal elections in north Mitrovica,
UNMIK, with the agreement of the Serbian government, took over control of Serb-
controlled north Mitrovica, dissolving the parallel Serb institutions, permitting the
removal of the blockades, and the extension of the jurisdiction of Kosovo’s police
force to the area.  The Serbian government has pledged to stop funding the parallel
institutions.  However, ethnic Albanians have expressed concerns that the deal will
not truly reunite the city, since the jurisdiction of the ethnic Albanian-controlled city
council will not extend there, the local administration in north Mitrovica will likely
be filled with Serbs previously employed by the parallel institutions, and refugees are
not guaranteed a speedy return to their homes.
Another  important issue in Kosovo has been the status of ethnic Albanian
prisoners in Serbian jails. A February 2001 amnesty law  led to the release of many
of those jailed, although about 200 persons remained imprisoned.  About half of the
group were common criminals, while the other half were convicted of “terrorism.”
Belgrade released this final group of prisoners into UNMIK’s custody in March 2002.
Many analysts view the progress made in Kosovo in the past three-and-a-half
years as mixed.  Kosovo has had the most free and fair elections in its history, and
has set up autonomous institutions.  Violence against political opponents and
minorities has declined, but continues to occur.  Little progress has been made in
returning Serb refugees to their homes, and crimes involving property and business
interests continue to be a problem. Kosovo is a center for prostitution, human
trafficking, drugs and weapons smuggling, money laundering, and other illegal
activities. Official corruption (reportedly including UNMIK representatives in some
cases) is a serious problem. International reconstruction aid has helped rebuild much
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of the infrastructure destroyed in the war, but the economy is largely unreformed and
suffers from low foreign investment and high unemployment (over 40%). 
The Issue of Kosovo’s Final Status
The formation of Kosovo’s elected government in March 2002 marks an
important step forward in the international community’s efforts to stabilize the
province.  However, the issue of Kosovo’s final status remains unclear.  U.N.
Resolution 1244 reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and did not prescribe or prejudge a permanent
political resolution to the issue of Kosovo’s status. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
strongly favor independence of the province from the FRY and its international
recognition as a sovereign state as soon as possible.  
Kosovo’s independence is strongly opposed by the United States and other
Western countries, as well as by all of Kosovo’s neighbors, except Albania.  They
fear that an independent Kosovo could destabilize the region by encouraging
separatist ethnic Albanian forces in Macedonia, as well as Serbia’s Presevo Valley,
where many ethnic Albanians live.  Some UNMIK officials are also reportedly
skeptical about the ability of the Kosovars to run their own affairs, an attitude
perhaps reflected in the restricted powers given to the autonomous government by the
Constitutional Framework.    They say discussion about Kosovo’s future should be
frozen for several years in order to prevent a renewal of conflict and to allow for
fledgling autonomous structures to operate and develop.  According to this view,
priority should be given to maintaining peace, enhancing stability and establishing
conditions for refugee return and economic development. 
However, some experts have expressed skepticism about the feasibility of the
international community’s efforts to postpone clarification of the final status issue
to an indefinite future. They believe that it is unrealistic to try to ignore  the clearly
expressed desire of the overwhelming majority of the population of Kosovo on the
issue that they see, rightly or wrongly, as most important to them.   Some also believe
that the uncertainty created by postponing the resolution of this issue could have a
negative impact on Kosovo’s political and economic stability. Indeed, some
Kosovars claim that continued uncertainty over Kosovo’s ultimate future has had a
negative impact on such issues as rule of law, privatization and attracting foreign
investment.  Moreover, the international community is increasingly preoccupied with
other global challenges, and may seek to move forward on the issue of a final
settlement in order to begin to wind down the international peacekeeping mission in
Kosovo.    
In October 2000, an independent commission of experts produced a report
advocating “conditional independence” for Kosovo.  Under the proposal, the
international community would gradually turn over full powers to the Kosovo
government and recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, if it agreed to certain
conditions, which could include respecting the territorial integrity of neighboring
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2 The report, with an September 2001 update, can be found at
[http://www.kosovocommission.org]
countries, real guarantees of democracy and minority rights, a renunciation of
violence to solve internal and external disputes, and regional cooperation.2  
Serbian Views
The FRY and Serbian governments, as well as Kosovo’s Serbs, are strongly
opposed to Kosovo’s independence.  The democratic leadership in Belgrade is not
pleased with the loss of effective Serbian control over the province enshrined in
UNSC Res. 1244, but nevertheless calls for its strict implementation, since it
supports at least nominal FRY sovereignty over the province.   Serbian Deputy Prime
Minister and Kosovo envoy Nebojsa Covic has met frequently with the UNMIK
Special Representative Michael Steiner, and has served as a key voice for Kosovo’s
Serb community, which has looked to Belgrade rather than Pristina for leadership.
Covic has argued that while Belgrade has cooperated on many fronts, no progress has
been made with regard to refugee returns (including the return of their property),
illegally imprisoned Serbs in Kosovo, or the fate of over one thousand missing or
kidnaped individuals.  However, Serbian leaders have had to balance their criticism
of Western policy in Kosovo with their need to secure Western aid to rebuilding their
economy.  
Covic has floated a cantonization plan for the province.  Under the plan,
Serbian-majority areas of the province would be controlled by local Serb authorities,
with their own police, and possibly with the deployment of Serbian police and army
troops.   Ethnic Albanian authorities would control the rest of the province.  Such a
plan would have the benefit, from Belgrade’s point of view, of consolidating its
control over northern Kosovo, where most Serbs in the province now live, and where
important economic assets, such as the Trepca mining complex, are found.   Ethnic
Albanian leaders have strongly opposed the idea for these very reasons.  International
officials fear that cantonization could lead to the eventual partition of the province
along ethnic lines, which could in turn spark renewed violence.  However, before the
October 2002 local elections, UNMIK Special Representative Michael Steiner has
proposed opening discussions on “decentralization” of Kosovo by giving more power
to local officials. The low Serb turnout in the vote may make this effort more
difficult.     
The issue of Kosovo’s status may have become more complicated due to the
impending dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and  the establishment
of a much looser relationship between Serbia and Montenegro.  The two republics
have  reached agreement on a Constitutional Charter to govern their relations, which
is expected to go into effect in early 2003.  The charter describes Kosovo as part of
Serbia, a provision that has been denounced by Kosovar Albanians.  Kosovar
Albanians claim that once the FRY no longer exists, Kosovo can no longer be
considered part of it, and will be free to choose (via a referendum) independence.  On
the other hand, the Kosovo Serbs claim that the deal between Serbia and
Montenegro, which was heavily promoted by representatives of the international
community, was intended to forestall the further disintegration of states and regions
CRS-9
in the former Yugoslavia, and demonstrated international opposition to Kosovo’s
independence.  
International Response
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) forms the basis of the
international role in Kosovo.  It authorized the deployment of an international
security presence in Kosovo, led by NATO, under a mission to ensure that Yugoslav
forces are withdrawn from Kosovo; that the cease-fire is maintained; and that the
KLA is demilitarized.  The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is charged with “establishing a
secure environment” for the return of refugees, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and
the operation of the international civilian administration.  Resolution 1244 says
KFOR is to oversee the return of “hundreds, not thousands” of Yugoslav troops to
Kosovo to liaise with the international presence, mark minefields, provide a
“presence” at Serb historical monuments and “key border crossings.”  To date, no
Yugoslav Army troops have returned to Kosovo for these purposes, but in March
2001, NATO approved the phased return of Yugoslav Army forces to the formerly
demilitarized buffer zone between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia.  
  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 gives the U.N. mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) the chief role in administering Kosovo on a provisional basis. These duties
include administration of the province; maintaining law and order, including setting
up an international police force and creating local police forces; supporting
humanitarian aid efforts; returning refugees to their homes; protecting human rights;
supporting the reconstruction effort; preparing the way for elections; and facilitating
talks on Kosovo’s final status.   The resolution provides for an interim period of
autonomy for Kosovo for an undefined length of time, until negotiations on the final
status of the province take place. It expresses support for the FRY’s territorial
integrity.
Bernard Kouchner of France served as the first Special Representative of the
U.N. Secretary-General to oversee UNMIK until January 2001.  He was replaced by
Hans Haekkerup, Denmark’s Defense Minister, on January 15, 2001, who resigned
in December of the same year.  The current head of UNMIK is Michael Steiner, a
German diplomat with extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia.  Charles
Brayshaw of the United States is currently the Principal Deputy Special
Representative.
UNMIK initially had a four-pillar structure divided into humanitarian aid, civil
administration, democratic institution-building, and reconstruction.  UNMIK phased
out the humanitarian aid pillar in mid-2000 and added a police and justice pillar in
2001.  The United Nations leads the police and justice pillar as well as the one for
civil administration; the Organization for Security and Cooperation leads the
institution-building pillar; and the European Union leads the reconstruction pillar.
The authorization for UNMIK automatically continues unless the Security
Council decides otherwise.  In his latest report to the Security Council, U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted the achievement of forming the Kosovo
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government and called upon it to set an example of inclusion and reconciliation
between Kosovo’s communities.  He praised the release of Kosovo Albanian
detainees from Serbia and improvements in the overall security situation, but
expressed concerns about increasing violence against international personnel
deployed in Kosovo and the prospect for increased violence as UNMIK implements
anti-crime initiatives.3
KFOR
 According to DoD and NATO sources, KFOR has about 32,000 troops in
Kosovo.4  The United States has about 4,200 troops in the province.  The U.S.
controls one of five KFOR sectors in Kosovo. Other leading contributors are Italy,
Germany, France, and Britain. Each has its own sector in Kosovo. Other participating
countries serve under commanders from these countries.  Other countries in the U.S.
sector are Greece, Lithuania, Russia, Poland and Ukraine.  Russia initially deployed
about 3,400 troops to KFOR, but has sharply reduced them to about 600, due partly
to budgetary contraints.  NATO agreed in June 2002 to cut the number of troops in
KFOR by nearly one-quarter, to 32,000 by the end of 2002, and to 29,000 by the end
of June 2003.  The number of sectors will also be reduced.  The United States will
retain its sector, but the four remaining sectors will be merged into two.
 KFOR’s mission, in accordance with UNSC 1244, is to monitor, verify, and
enforce the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement and the KLA
demilitarization agreement.  KFOR is also charged with establishing and maintaining
a secure environment in Kosovo, including maintaining public safety and order until
UNMIK can take over this responsibility more fully. KFOR has deployed a 320-man
paramilitary police unit consisting of French, Italian and Estonian troops to assist in
policing tasks. KFOR has also provided support to UNMIK and non-government
organizations for reconstruction and humanitarian projects.  KFOR successfully
oversaw the pullout of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo and the implementation of the
KLA demilitarization agreement.  However, KFOR was not entirely successful
initially in maintaining order in Kosovo, including in stopping attacks against Serbs
and other minorities.  KFOR troops, including U.S. soldiers, have been fired on or
assaulted in numerous incidents.  Scores of KFOR soldiers have been injured and
several peacekeepers have been shot and killed since 1999.  Other soldiers have been
killed when their vehicles struck mines, including one U.S. soldier.  In a May 2002
report to Congress, President Bush said KFOR had transferred full responsibility for
policing duties to UNMIK and local police, except for Mitrovica.  
In 2000 and 2001, U.S., Russian and other KFOR peacekeepers detained scores
of men and seized substantial quantities of weaponry in an attempt to stop ethnic
Albanian guerrillas from moving men and supplies into 3 mile-wide demilitarized
Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) in southern Serbia, which served as a staging area for
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guerrilla attacks against Serbian police in the Presevo valley region.  On March 8,
2001, NATO agreed to the gradual elimination of the GSZ.  In March through May
2001, KFOR conducted a phased return of  most of the GSZ to the Yugoslav army
and Serbian police forces.  The ethnic Albanian guerrilla groups disbanded and
several hundred surrendered to KFOR troops in Kosovo.
In addition to the problems in southern Serbia, from March to August 2001
KFOR had to deal with a guerrilla insurgency in Macedonia. On March 7, U.S. and
other KFOR troops within Kosovo, in a coordinated effort with Macedonian forces
in their own country, flushed guerrillas from the border town of Tanusevci.  U.S.
troops exchanged fire with a group of them. No U.S. troops were hurt, but two
guerrillas were wounded. Angry Macedonian officials charged that KFOR has failed
to stop the transport of weapons and men from Kosovo to the guerrillas over the
heavily forested and mountainous border region.  Hundreds of U.S. and other KFOR
troops had limited success in blocking rebel supply routes in the remote and rugged
border region.  After the parties in Macedonia reached a peace agreement in August
2001, NATO countries sent a small force, separate from KFOR, to monitor the
disarmament of the rebels and security situation in the country.  
UNMIK Activities and Issues
Since establishing its presence in June 1999, UNMIK representatives have
issued regulations on the legislative and executive authority of UNMIK, the
establishment of a customs service, use of the Deutsche Mark (now the euro) as the
commonly used currency in Kosovo, small-scale lending services, and the self-
government of the municipalities after the local elections. UNMIK oversees
administration of public funds in Kosovo, including payments of salaries and
pensions.  UNMIK has also established customs controls on goods entering the
province from Serbia, a practice vehemently opposed to by Kosovo’s local Serb
communities.5
Addressing the U.N. Security Council in April 2002, new UNMIK chief
Michael Steiner outlined four priorities for the mission: consolidate the provisional
institutions of self government; boost the economy through job creation and
privatization; enhance the rule of law, especially through building effective police
forces and the judicial system; and facilitate returns of refugees and displaced persons
with an integrated and structured effort over the next two years.  He emphasized that
implementation of Resolution 1244 was now a joint effort between UNMIK and
Kosovo’s new provisional institutions of self-government.
Moreover, Steiner offered a “vision on how to finish our job,” or an “exit
strategy” for the international mission as it continues the process of transferring
responsibilities to Kosovo’s new provisional institutions.  Steiner outlined a series
of benchmarks of international expectations for Kosovo’s institutions and society,
and argued that they should be achieved before the issue of Kosovo’s final status is
discussed.    
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The benchmarks are:
- existence of effective, representative and functioning institutions;
- enforcement of the rule of law;
- freedom of movement;
- respect for the right of all Kosovans to remain and return;
- development of a sound basis for a market economy;
- clarity of property title;
- normalized dialogue with Belgrade;
- reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line with its
mandate.6
Civil Administration (including Police and Justice).  The international
civil administration component of UNMIK comprises three offices: a police
commissioner, a civil affairs office, and a judicial affairs office.  Tom Koenigs of
Germany is Deputy Special Representative in charge of this pillar. In May 2001,
UNMIK established a separate police and justice pillar to provide greater focus on
these areas.  Jean-Christian Cady of France currently heads the police and justice
pillar. 
In the absence of local institutions, UNMIK first established an integrated
administrative structure with local authorities. In mid-July 1999, Special
Representative Kouchner chaired the first meeting of the Kosovo Transitional
Council (KTC), a broadly representative consultative body under UNMIK that
includes ethnic Serb representatives.  The Transitional Council would generally meet
on a weekly basis.  The KTC held its final meeting in October 2001, prior to the first
elections for the Kosovo assembly.  In December 1999, Kouchner signed an accord
on establishing a new Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS).  The structure
included an Interim Administrative Council and 19 administrative departments.  The
Council comprised three Albanian members, one Serb, and four UNMIK
representatives. The Interim Administrative Council functioned until the
establishment of the provisional institutions of self-government in early 2002.
In March 2001, UNMIK chief Haekkerup established the Working Group on the
Interim Legal Framework for Provisional Self-Government, a multi-ethnic panel to
propose measures to achieve provisional self-government in the province.  On May
16, Haekkerup signed into law the regulation on the Constitutional Framework for
Provisional Self-Government.  The Framework called for the establishment of a 120-
member assembly, with 20 seats guaranteed for ethnic minority communities
(including 10 for the ethnic Serb community).  UNMIK retains ultimate executive
authority, including veto power, and exclusive authority in some areas, such as
justice, customs, monetary policy, and the Kosovo Protection Corps.  Human rights
safeguards are prominently featured in the Framework. The Framework does not
prejudge a final settlement for Kosovo and makes no reference to holding a
referendum on Kosovo’s status, a long-held demand of Kosovo’s Albanian leaders.
KFOR remains guarantor of peace and security in the province.
CRS-13
A key component of civil administration has been the promotion of law and
order in the province.  To this end, UNMIK established international and local civil
police forces and new judicial bodies, which in May 2001 were re-aligned into the
new police and justice pillar of UNMIK.  The UNMIK police force has an authorized
size of about 4,700. As April 2002, about 4,600 international police personnel from
over 50 countries were deployed. UN police officers conduct patrols jointly with
KFOR, and have policing authority in the Pristina and Prizren regions. The UNMIK
police also work with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) comprised of local recruits
(see section on institution-building, below), which is eventually to take over law and
order functions from UNMIK.  UNMIK has recruited over 4,600 Kosovars (many
former KLA members) for the Kosovo Protection Corps, intended for emergency and
humanitarian situations rather than for providing law and order.  Its maximum
strength is 5,000.  In June 2002, UNMIK arrested five ethnic Albanian males,
reportedly including three senior officials in the Kosovo Protection Corps, for alleged
involvement in crimes relating to other ethnic Albanians.
In June 1999, the U.N. Representative swore in a multi-ethnic panel of nine
judges (five Albanians, three Serbs, and one Turk).  The judicial panel operates under
a modified version of Yugoslavia’s criminal code.  Over 400 judges and prosecutors
had been appointed by UNMIK, mostly ethnic Albanians. There are currently 8
international judges and 6 international prosecutors appointed to serve in Kosovo. 
A Kosovo Supreme Court was inaugurated on December 14, 2000.  As part of the
new UNMIK pillar on police and justice affairs, UNMIK plans to increase the
number of international judges and prosecutors.  UNMIK also created a special unit
to combat organized crime and sponsored in Pristina an international conference on
means to counter cigarette smuggling in May 2002.
Institution-Building.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), headed by Deputy Special Representative Pascal Fieschi (France)
leads international institution-building efforts in Kosovo.  The task of institution-
building is comprised of four components: training in justice, police, and public
administration (in cooperation with the Council of Europe); human rights monitoring
(in cooperation with the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights);
democratization and governance; and, organizing and supervising elections.  350
international and 1,150 local OSCE staff comprise the mission in twenty-one field
offices. 
Recruitment for the training academy of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has
been a priority for the mission.  In August 1999, the KPS police academy opened in
Vucitrn.  Several training sessions for recruits have been completed.  Most of the
recruits have been ethnic Albanian (many of whom were formerly members of the
KLA), with about 17% from minority communities.   The ultimate strength of the
KPS is to reach up to 6,000 by the end of 2002. As of November 2002, the KPS had
5,300 officers, outnumbering UNMIK police for the first time. The KPS  performs
some independent patrols in designated areas of Kosovo.
Civil and voter registration, in preparation for the first municipal elections on
October 28, 2000, began on April 28 and was completed on July 17.  About 1 million
voters registered.  However, Kosovo’s Serb and Turk communities largely boycotted
the process.  28 political parties and organizations and 5,500 candidates registered
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to run in 30 municipalities.  Nearly 80% of eligible voters participated in the largely
peaceful vote.  Results in 27 municipalities certified by the OSCE on November 7
showed the LDK winning decisively with 58% of the vote. UNMIK appointed
assemblies in the three non-certified (majority Serb) municipalities.  
For the November 2001 general elections, 26 political parties were certified to
run.  U.N. Secretary-General Annan and all 15 members of the Security Council
called on all communities in Kosovo, in particular the Serb and other minority
groups, to participate in the upcoming vote.  Although Belgrade eventually came out
in favor of Serb participation in the vote after a great deal of international pressure,
many local Kosovo Serb leaders continued to object to the elections. On November
17, international observers organized by OSCE and the Council of Europe judged the
election to be a success and an improvement over the 2000 municipal vote.  Some
incidents of violence and intimidation contributed to low turnout in some Serb areas.
Overall turnout dipped to 64% from 78% in the 2000 vote. 
The OSCE mission in Kosovo also works to develop a democratic and
independent media and promote the rule of law.  A Media Advisory Board comprised
of Albanian and Serb experts was created in August 1999.  The OSCE established
Radio-Television Kosovo (RTK) as an independent public broadcaster.  With regard
to human rights, OSCE personnel regularly monitor the human rights situation
throughout the province.  Reviews of the human rights situation have condemned the
continuation of ethnic violence against non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo. The
latest joint OSCE/UNHCR report on ethnic minorities (from May 2002) reported
some gradual improvements in security for ethnic minorities, while noting continued
problems in freedom of movement for minorities and the presence of parallel
administrative structures within minority communities.  In July 2000, UNMIK
established an office of the ombudsman for Kosovo to investigate complaints about
abuses of authority.  The Kosovo Ombudsman is Marek Nowicki of Poland.7  The
OSCE also established a Kosovo Judicial Institute and a Kosovo Law Center to assist
in promoting institutions of the rule of law in Kosovo.
Humanitarian Aid and Refugee Returns.  At the July 28, 2000, donors’
conference in Brussels (see below), participating countries pledged more than $2
billion in humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Kosovo.  Of this amount, about
$245 million was designated for emergency humanitarian needs. The humanitarian
affairs pillar of UNMIK was phased out in July 2000, as the international
community’s focus shifted from humanitarian to development assistance.  In June
2002, the U.N. World Food Program announced the completion of its humanitarian
aid program in Kosovo.
The vast majority of ethnic Albanian refugees and displaced persons returned
to Kosovo with remarkable speed after June 1999.  Since then, several thousand more
have returned or been expelled from western European countries, especially Germany
and Switzerland.  The arrest and detention in Serbia of hundreds of Kosovar
Albanians during the Kosovo conflict became a contentious issue between Belgrade
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and Kosovo.  After Milosevic’s fall from power in October 2000, UNMIK increased
its appeals for the release of Kosovar Albanian prisoners in Serbia.  Finally in March
2002, Serbia transferred the remaining Kosovar Albanians that had been detained in
Serbian prisons. 
As ethnic Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo, large numbers of ethnic Serbs
and Roma (Gypsies) left the province, mainly for Serbia and Montenegro. UNHCR
estimated that over 200,000 Serbs and Roma left Kosovo after the end of the NATO
air strikes in June 1999.8  Up to 100,000 Serbs still reside in Kosovo. A Joint
Committee on Returns for Kosovo Serbs was established in May 2000 to facilitate
the return of Serbs to Kosovo.  However, few have been able to return because of the
unstable security environment in Kosovo.  Moreover, some that have returned have
left again in response to attacks and/or harassment.  In November 2001, UNMIK
established an Office of Returns and Communities, which is preparing plans for
returns to 25 locations throughout Kosovo.  In May 2002, UNMIK Chief Steiner
issued a Concept Paper on the issue of returns that outlined principles regarding the
right of return and strategies on facilitating sustainable returns. 
Reconstruction.    A High Level Steering Group oversees the reconstruction
effort in Kosovo.  The group, composed of the EU, the World Bank, the G-7 finance
ministers, and representatives of leading international organizations, is chaired by the
EU and World Bank.  
According to the EU and World Bank, from June 1999 through December 2001,
donors pledged $2.14 billion in total aid to Kosovo (of which $1.8 billion was
reconstruction aid, $169 million was budgetary support and $166 million was peace
implementation aid).  Of this amount, $1.9 billion was obligated and $1.46 billion
was spent.  According to the EU-World Bank figures, the United States pledged
$315.9 million in aid to Kosovo, obligated $289.2 million, and spent $244.56
million.  
At a November 2002  meeting, international donors took stock of what has been
achieved in Kosovo and what needs to be done.  International aid and the efforts of
ordinary Kosovars have resulted in progress in rebuilding housing and key physical
infrastructure.  Over two-thirds of the 120,000 damaged or destroyed houses have
been rebuilt, electricity generation now exceeds pre-war levels, and many roads and
bridges have been rebuilt.  However, much reconstruction work still needs to be
done.  Some progress has been made in reviving Kosovo’s economy.  The small
business sector is growing, and the situation in the agricultural sector, which employs
about 40% of the population, has also improved. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s economy
is still very weak.  Unemployment in Kosovo may be as high as 40%, according to
UNMIK.  Kosovo remains highly dependent on international funding, and UNMIK
and Kosovo government officials are concerned about the effect on Kosovo’s
economy as international aid declines over the medium term. They hope to avoid a
sharp contraction in assistance, at least for 2003-2004.  They are seeking in particular
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international aid to bolster education, health, transport, the energy sector, refugee
return, and the rule of law, which they believe may be underfunded by the
international community. UNMIK says Kosovo will need an additional $450 million
Euros ($466 million) in international aid for the period 2003-2005. 
International efforts are focused on privatization and fostering private sector
growth, including by creating a legal framework and strengthening the financial
sector. In April 2002, UNMIK chief Steiner announced the creation of a Kosovo
Trust Agency to manage and oversee the process of privatization, which is intended
to spur job creation and attract investment. 9 
War Crimes
On May 27, 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)  announced the indictment of Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic, Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, FRY Deputy Prime Minister Nikola
Sainovic, Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of
Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed by Yugoslav and Serbian forces in Kosovo. The indictments were the first
issued by the Tribunal relating to the Kosovo conflict. (These indictments were
amended in June and October 2001 to add new charges related to the Kosovo
conflict.)   The ICTY is focusing its efforts on high-level officials.  Local courts in
Kosovo headed by international judges and prosecutors are trying cases against low-
level accused war criminals.  
On June 13, 2000, Del Ponte released a report that said that she would not indict
NATO officials for alleged war crimes during NATO’s air campaign.  The report said
that “although some mistakes were made by NATO, the Prosecutor is satisfied that
there was no deliberate targeting of civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO
during the campaign.”  On June 21, 2000, Del Ponte said her office was investigating
possible KLA war crimes during the Kosovo conflict and could bring charges against
top KLA officials. On March 21, 2001, Del Ponte said that she would investigate
crimes against Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo since the deployment of KFOR
as well as the activities of ethnic Albanian guerrillas in the Presevo valley in southern
Serbia.  In June and November 2002, UNMIK police arrested former KLA soldiers,
including a former top commander known as Remi, for murders of ethnic Albanians
during the war in Kosovo.  The charges were brought by an international prosecutor
in Kosovo’s justice system, not by the ICTY. 
 Anxious to avoid a U.S. boycott of a June 29, 2001 conference of aid donors
to the FRY, the Serbian government transferred Milosevic to the ICTY on June 28.
Milosevic’s trial for crimes committed in Kosovo began in February 2002.  Several
other indicted war criminals continue to live in Serbia, including Serbian President
and Milosevic-era holdover Milan Milutinovic. After the FRY passed a law on
cooperation with the Tribunal in April 2002,  Ojdanic and Sainovic surrendered to
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the Tribunal. Stojiljkovic committed suicide outside the Yugoslav parliament
building.   It is possible that indictments could be forthcoming against other former
and serving Serbian police and FRY military officials who occupied key positions
during ethnic cleansing operations in Kosovo. In a November 2001 document
prepared for the trial of Milosevic, ICTY prosecutors said they were investigating the
roles of Milosevic’s subordinates in his crimes, including former Yugoslav Army
chief Nebojsa Pavkovic and Sreten Lukic, now head of Serbia’s police forces.10   
U.S. Policy
From the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo, the Clinton Administration
condemned Serbian human rights abuses and called for autonomy for Kosovo within
Yugoslavia, while opposing independence.  The Clinton Administration pushed for
air strikes against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet accords in
March 1999, but refused to consider the use of ground troops to eject Yugoslav
forces from Kosovo.  However, even before the air strikes, the Clinton
Administration said that U.S. troops would participate in a Kosovo peace-keeping
force if a peace agreement were reached.  After the conflict, President Clinton said
that the U.S. and  NATO troop commitment to Kosovo could be reduced as local
autonomous institutions took  hold.   He said that the United States and the European
Union must work together to rebuild Kosovo and the region, but that “Europe must
provide most of the resources.”11 
During the 2000 Presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, later appointed by
President-elect Bush as his National Security Advisor, said that U.S. military forces
are overextended globally, and that peacekeeping responsibilities in the Balkans
should be taken over by U.S. allies in Europe.  However, after taking office, the
Administration  appeared to adopt a more cautious tone.  In February 2001, Secretary
of State Colin Powell said that the United States had a commitment to peace in the
Balkans  and that  NATO forces would have to remain in Bosnia and Kosovo for
“years.” He said the United States was reviewing U.S. troop levels in Bosnia and
Kosovo with the objective of reducing them over time, but stressed that the United
States would act in consultation with its allies and was not “cutting and running.” 
During a July 24, 2001 visit to U.S. troops in Kosovo, President Bush reiterated
this position, saying that 
we will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or
unilaterally.  We came in together, and we will go out together.  But our goal is
to hasten the day when peace is self-sustaining, when local, democratically
elected authorities can assume full responsibility, and when NATO's forces can
go home.  This means that we must re-organize and re-energize our efforts to
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build civil institutions and promote rule of law.  It also means that we must step
up our efforts to transfer responsibilities for public security from combat forces
to specialized units, international police, and ultimately local authorities.
NATO's commitment to the peace of this region is enduring, but the stationing
of our forces here should not be indefinite.  
The September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States reinforced the
Administration’s desire to decrease the U.S. deployment in the Balkans by turning
more responsibility over to the Europeans.  In October 2001, the Administration
informed U.S. allies in NATO that some U.S. forces may have to be withdrawn from
the Balkans to take part in the war on terrorism, and asked European countries to
make up any shortfalls.  The Europeans reportedly agreed to the request.  So far, a
dramatic decrease in the U.S. deployment has not occurred.   However, in part due
to U.S. urging, NATO agreed in June 2002 to cut the number of troops in KFOR
from 38,000 currently to 32,000 by the end of 2002, and to 29,000 by the end of June
2003. The United States is expected to share proportionately in this reduction of
nearly 25% of overall troop levels. This would translate into a withdrawal of about
1,300 troops of its force of 5,500.  Since September 11, the Administration has also
stressed the need to make sure the region does not become a haven for terrorists.
In 2001, the United States condemned the ethnic Albanian guerrillas in
Macedonia as a threat to peace and stability in the region.  On June 27, 2001,
President Bush issued an Executive Order prohibiting  Americans from "transferring,
paying, exporting, withdrawing or otherwise dealing in the property or interests in
property of persons involved in violent and obstructionist actions" in the Balkans.
Bush also barred entry to the United States of those "who actively obstruct
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords or UN Security Council Resolution
1244 and who otherwise seek to undermine peace and stability in the region" or "who
are responsible for wartime atrocities committed in the region since 1991."  The order
lists 35 persons and organizations covered by the restrictions, including the leaders
of ethnic Albanian guerrilla groups in Macedonia and southern Serbia, as well as
persons and groups in Kosovo supporting them.12
 During his visit to Kosovo, President Bush warned that “those here in Kosovo
who support the insurgency in Macedonia are hurting the interests of ethnic
Albanians throughout the region.  The people of Kosovo should focus on Kosovo.
They need to concentrate on developing civil institutions that work and a political
climate that supports and sustains democracy, the rule of law, ethnic tolerance, and
cooperation with neighbors.” The United States pushed for the signature and
implementation of the Macedonian peace agreement adopted in August 2001.  The
United States has provided logistical and other support, but no troops, to a NATO-led
force in Macedonia that is monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement.
The Administration also strongly supported plans by the European Union to take over
the Macedonia mission by the end of 2002. 
U.S. officials welcomed the successful completion of Kosovo’s first general
election on November 17, 2001.  They praised the free and fair character and the
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inclusion of Kosovo’s Serbs and other minorities in the vote.  The Administration has
emphasized, however, that the new provisional institutions in Kosovo will not have
the authority to make decisions on Kosovo’s final status.  The Bush Administration
opposes independence for Kosovo.  
According to the Department of Defense Comptroller’s Office, DoD
incremental costs for Kosovo through the end of June 2001 were $5.87 billion.  This
figure included $1.89 billion for the 1999 NATO air war, $3.78 billion for KFOR,
$141.6 million in refugee aid, $34.6 million for the OSCE observer mission before
the war, and $20.3 million for the pre-war aerial verification mission.  In FY1999,
the United States provided $333.7 million in reconstruction, humanitarian and other
aid to Kosovo. In FY2000, the United States provided $178 million in aid to Kosovo,
$149.67 million in FY2001, and planned to spend $118 million in FY 2002. The
Administration’s FY2003 budget proposed $85 million in aid to Kosovo.  Since
1999, U.S. aid has shifted away from humanitarian and reconstruction aid toward
assistance aimed at democratization, the rule of law and establishing a free market
economy.
Congressional Response
In 1999, the 106th Congress debated whether U.S. and NATO air strikes in
Kosovo were in the U.S. national interest, and whether the President could undertake
them without congressional approval. In the end, Congress neither explicitly
approved nor blocked the air strikes, but appropriated funds for the air campaign and
the U.S. peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo after the fact.  In 2000, some Members
unsuccessfully attempted to condition the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo on
Congressional approval and on the implementation of aid pledges made by European
countries.  Many Members of Congress said that they expected U.S. allies in Europe
to contribute the lion’s share of aid to the region and expressed concern that
European countries were slow to implement their aid pledges.  Congress moved to
limit U.S. aid to Kosovo to 15% of the total amount pledged by all countries.13
The 107th Congress focused on limiting the cost of the continuing U.S.
engagement in Kosovo.  The FY 2002 foreign aid appropriations law (P.L. 107-115)
provides $621 million in aid for central and eastern Europe under the Support for
East European Democracy (SEED) program, but no earmark for Kosovo.  The bill
says that aid to Kosovo “should  not exceed 15 percent of the total resources pledged
by all donors for calendar year 2002 for assistance for Kosovo as of March 31, 2002.”
The bill also bars U.S. aid for “large scale physical infrastructure reconstruction” in
Kosovo.  The FY 2002 defense authorization law (P.L. 107-107) limited funding for
U.S. peacekeeping troops to $1.5286 billion.  The President may waive this provision
if he certifies that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States
and that it will not adversely affect the readiness of U.S. forces.  The President must
submit a report on these issues as well as a supplemental appropriations request.
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The 107th Congress did not pass FY 2003 foreign operations legislation before
adjourning.  Current operations are funded by a continuing resolution. However, a
FY 2003 foreign operations appropriations bill (H.R. 5410), approved by the House
Appropriations Committee on September 19, 2002, contains a provision limiting U.S.
aid to Kosovo to 15% of the amount pledged by all contributors.  A FY 2003 Foreign
Operations bill (S. 2779) passed by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 24,
2002 contained the same provision.  It also contained language deducting  an amount
from U.S. aid to Serbia equal to the amount of assistance provided by the  FRY to
“parallel” security structures in Kosovo and earmarking $2 million for training
programs for Kosovar women.   
